Parametric secret injection — one tool, N sub-tenants, one axon-tenant

Primitives used: tool · flow

// The multi-sub-tenant shape: one axon-tenant serves N business
// customers, each with their OWN connected CRM. Their OAuth
// bundles are custodied under keys `crm.hubspot.<tenant_id>` (seeded by
// the adopter's OAuth callback via POST /tenant/secrets, one row per
// customer). v2.48.0 lets a daemon enumerate + rotate the whole `crm.*`
// class; v2.49.0 lets a single tool CONSUME the right customer's credential.

// A vendor ACTION tool. `secret: crm.hubspot` is the class key (a
// compile-time literal); `secret_partition: tenant_id` names one of this
// tool's OWN `String` parameters whose value becomes a single appended
// key segment at dispatch. A `use CrmCrearContacto(tenant_id = "acme", …)`
// resolves the custody key `crm.hubspot.acme` and injects its value under
// the reserved `axon_secret` field — the flow never touches it, and the
// segment charset (`[a-z0-9_-]`, no dot) makes the resolved key provably
// in-class: it can never reach `crm.*` at large or another class like
// `llm.*` (axon-T903 pins the partition to a declared String parameter).
tool CrmCrearContacto {
    secret: crm.hubspot
    secret_partition: tenant_id
    parameters: { tenant_id: String, nombre: String, email: String }
    output_type: String
}

// The business tenant travels as an ordinary flow parameter (resolved by
// the adopter's io-layer from the end-user's API key / JWT — the same
// trust boundary that already decides which tenant a request is for).
// Consuming the per-customer credential is just calling the tool; the
// selection is invisible to cognition and the value never binds.
flow CrearContacto(tenant_id: String, nombre: String, email: String) -> String {
    use CrmCrearContacto(tenant_id = tenant_id, nombre = nombre, email = email)
    return CrmCrearContacto.output
}