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Delivery is assertion egress — a value written into a system of record must carry its…

deliver is the point where a value leaves the epistemic lattice into a machine system of record — a CRM whose rows downstream humans treat as verified fact. It is the exact dual of scrape (v2.52.0): where a scraped value ENTERS the program born adversarial and Untrusted, a delivered value goes OUT into a system that confers an authority the value may never have earned.

The law. A value written into a system of record must carry its epistemic origin (provenance: attached, the default), OR the author must have vouched — under epistemic { believe|know }, after a shield + anchor cleared it — that it is a verified fact (provenance: cleared). Stripping the origin from an Untrusted / Inferred value at the delivery boundary is impossible: it is a compile-time refusal (axon-T920), not a runtime surprise. A vendor's guess arrives in the CRM labeled a guess, or it does not arrive bare.

Why this is a law, not a lint

A v2.58.0-enriched email is a vendor model's probabilistic guess — born speculate (a pattern heuristic) or believe (deliverability-verified), never know, and epistemically Untrusted. The CRM does not know that. A row in a system of record reads as true — the format confers authority the value never earned. Booking a speculate email as a bare email field is precisely the assertion-laundering v2.53.0 forbids for a document (T916); deliver is that barrier in egress form (T920).

The surface

deliver PushLead {
target: crm # the system-of-record class (axon-T921)
provenance: attached # each field lands with its level/confidence/source
secret: crm_api_key # v2.48.0 custody — the credential never enters cognition
effects: <web> # a CRM write crosses the network trust boundary (axon-T924)
upsert_contact {
key: lead_email # idempotency key — a retry never double-creates (axon-T926)
email: lead_email
name: lead_name
}
}

provenance: cleared is legal ONLY when the flow vouches:

# axon-T920: launders a vendor guess into the CRM as a bare fact.
deliver bad { target: crm secret: k effects: <web> provenance: cleared
upsert_contact { key: guessed_email email: guessed_email }
}

# OK: the author vouches the values are ≥ believe (after shield + anchor).
believe {
deliver good { target: crm secret: k effects: <web> provenance: cleared
upsert_contact { key: verified_email email: verified_email }
}
}

The three enforcement layers (all fail-closed)

  1. Compileaxon-T920 (the provenance-stripping barrier) + T921–T926 (target catalog, provenance catalog, secret: required, web effect, operation catalog + non-empty, idempotency key:).
  2. Verify / deploy — the PCC DeliveryProvenanceSoundness class re-derives T920 (+ T921/T924) from the compiled IR, so a hand-edited IR that flips provenance to cleared without the vouch is REFUTED before it deploys.
  3. Runtime (enterprise) — a crm:deliver SoD gate (role-expanding) + a per-tenant legal flag (default OFF) + a fail-closed crm:delivered audit that witnesses the delivery's op kinds + field-count — never the PII values (a delivered email is itself a PII record).

What the law does NOT promise

  • Not that the CRM keeps the label. Once the bytes reach the vendor, whether the axon_provenance companion survives is the adopter's CRM's responsibility — the same honest perimeter as document (v2.53.0): axon guarantees the artifact leaves labeled, not that every downstream tool respects the label.
  • Not a lawful basis. Delivering v2.58.0-enriched PII is further processing; the governance demonstrates diligence, it does not create a GDPR lawful basis (the tenant is the controller).

See also

  • document (v2.53.0) — the sibling egress primitive (into a human artifact); its T916 assertion-laundering barrier is the same law for a different sink.
  • scrape (v2.52.0) — the acquisition dual; born-Untrusted ingress.
  • The lead-gen vertical: acquire (v2.56.0) → enrich (v2.58.0) → deliver (v2.60.0).